Introduction
The concept of the value of information is one of the cornerstones of Decision Analysis [21, [3] . It is ordinarily presented as a consequence of Bayes' theorem. Now, experiments may indeed be presented in terms of conditional probabilities, thus the use of Bayes' theorem, or directly as a random variable which may take some posterior probability distributions according to a marginal probability. Equivalence between the two approaches has long been recognized in the statistics literature (see [1] ); however the second approach does not seem to have attracted much theoretical attention from decision analysts in spite of some practical advantages (see Example
in [4]).
The objective of the paper is to investigate some elementary properties of this second definition of experiments with respect to information value theory. The practical significance of these properties is also studied. PROOF. This is a standard result in decision analysis. * Assuming a linear utility for money, the EVI may be interpreted as the maximal price at which one should be willing to buy the experiment.
Comparing Experiments Defined in Extensive Form
Denote by PE the smallest convex subset of P which contains the vectors {Pe}eEE and for any real valued continuous function f(.) on P, let CavpEf(.) be the minimal concave function' greater or equal to f(.) on PE. Let EVI(po I E) be the expected value of information associated with the classical decision problem and an experiment E defined in extensive form. PROPOSITION We shall now characterize the experiments for which 2.2.1 is in general an equality. Define the P-class of classical decision problems as all problems for which S and po in P remain fixed whereas A and u(., *) are allowed to vary. DEFINITION 
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The experiment E is said to be efficient if and only if 2.2.1 is an equality for all problems in the P-class.
Note that the definition is meaningful since in order to define an experiment associated with a classical decision problem we need only know S and pO, that is, the P-class. PROPOSITION A typical illustration of the first condition is the case in which for some e, E E, Pe, -Po Then it is intuitive that the experiment is inefficient since we may very well end up with the same posterior probability distribution as our prior distribution. If Pe, is not too different frompo then the experiment will remain inefficient. How close it has to be for inefficiency is made precise by the corollary.
The second condition is more difficult to interpret. Essentially it is a question of dimensionality brought in by the finiteness of the set S.
Eventually, experiments should be compared in terms of EVI's. This comparison is easily facilitated for efficient experiments since then they may be partially ordered independently of the particular decision problem in the P-class. DEFINITION Then the optimal action is a2 and u*(po) = 0. 
The Experiment in Extensive

